The Federal government calls it a ‘Human Services Access Card’
We call it for what it is: The proposal for a National ID Card System
This page provides access to the sources that we have used during the campaign since the Government began the latest round of its national ID scheme push in mid-to-late 2005.
Government web-sites are unreliable. They are frequently ‘re-designed’, and the old links broken. Sometimes this is the fault of inadequate professionalism by systems people, and sometimes it is an intentional means of denying information to the public. The APF accordingly cannot be sure that the links below still work.
If you detect broken links, please advise the relevant government agency webmaster and request that it be put back, or the new URL advised. So that we can maintain this page, please send a copy of your correspondence to email@example.com.
The primary source is the Office of Access Card within DHS. The main places to look as at December 2006 were:
- Media Materials
- Industry Briefings
- Consumer and Privacy Briefings (but they don’t seem to think this is worth identifying as a separate category)
Materials on the site from about September 2006 include:
Materials released in February 2007 included:
- Media Release of 7 February, with no references at all to guide the media let alone the public to where the information is hidden
- at 11:45am 7 February, still no information apparent on the OAC web-site
- Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007
Materials released in December 2006 were:
- An Overview
- Industry Briefing Slide-Set (1.5MB!)
- Audio of the Industry Briefing Session (7MB!)
- Transcript of the Q&A at the end of the Industry Briefing Session
- Consumer and Privacy Briefing Slide-Set (incorrectly labelled as being a presentation by the Task Force – 1.3MB)
- 1st Bill (Exposure Draft)
- 1st Bill (Explanatory Memorandum)
Here are summaries of the Personal Data that the scheme is intended to use:
The so-called Consumer and Privacy Task Force, designed as a shield to protect the Department, and provide an appearance of consultative processes, produced an Issues Paper in June 2006, and then in November 2006 a report that seemed to start out talking tough, but recommended little more than motherhood. Nonetheless, the Minister immediately rejected the few recommendations of substance.
Some earlier materials include:
- Hockey’s Speech of 8 November 2006
- Hockey’s Speech of 27 May 2006
- Minister Hockey’s Media Release: ‘First Tenders and Appointments called to deliver Access Card’, 11 May 2006, mirrored here
- 7 short documents released by the Department of Human Services with the Budget, 9 May 2006
- Media Conference by Howard, with Attorney-General Ruddock and Minister for Human Services Joe Hockey, 26 April 2006, after the Cabinet meeting, mirrored here
- ‘Government to proceed with access card’ Media Release by Howard of 26 April 2006, mirrored here (because government Media Releases can disappear as soon as they become inconvenient, or when Governments change)
- the half page of information initially provided by the Government, undated, probably 26 April 2006, mirrored here
The crucial foundation documents appear to have been as follows:
- the crucial KPMG Report on the Business Case of what was then styled the ‘Health and Social Services Smart Card Initiative’ of c. February 2006. The Minister initially refused to publish this taxpayer-funded report, but by June his position had become untenable. To ease the pressure, he released an emasculated version of the KPMG report. The copy is of low quality, which makes it (perhaps intentionally?) difficult to navigate and analyse. Crucial sections deleted from it included the briefing documents that the consultants were provided with, the explanation of how the proposal will allegedly reduce fraud, the cost/benefit analysis itself (!), and any discussion of the privacy implications for Australians
- the equally important Clayton & Utz Privacy Assessment of c. February 2006. The Minister still refuses to publish this taxpayer-funded report. (It is reasonable to infer that it made recommendations that the Minister didn’t like. The Minister appears to have ignored the contents. As a result, his senior staff resigned – which is an outcome almost unheard of in Canberra, where senior executives do the Government’s bidding)
If you are aware of errors or omissions in this document, please let us know.